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Abstract—In the paper, we present a cross-layer perspective on
data transmission in energy harvesting cognitive radio networks
(CRNs). The delay optimal power allocation is studied while
taking into account the randomness of harvested energy, data
generation, channel state and the grid price. To guarantee
primary user (PU)’s transmission, its Signal-Interference-Ratio
(SIR) should be no less than a threshold. Each user, including PU
as well as secondary user (SU), has energy harvesting devices,
and the PU can also purchases the grid power. Each user is
rational and selfish to minimize its own the buffer delay. We
formulate a stochastic Stackelberg game in a bilevel manner.
After decoupling via rewriting the objective and constraints, an
equivalent tractable reconstruction is derived. First, we give a
distributive algorithm to obtain the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the
lower level SUs’ noncooperative stochastic game. Thereafter, the
stochastic Stackelberg game is discussed under the circumstances
that there is no information exchange between PU and SU.
Distributed iterative algorithms are designed. Furthermore, a
distributive online algorithm is proposed. Finally, simulations
are carried out to verify the correctness and demonstrate the
effectiveness of proposed algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Energy harvesting with the capability of scavenging electri-
cal energy from the environment (e.g., solar, ambient radio-
frequency (RF) signals) has been a promising maneuver in
green communications. Compared to conventional grid energy,
the harvested energy has natural green attribute, which makes
it extremely suitable to at least partially be the energy source
for green networks. Energy harvesting aided wireless transmis-
sion becomes a hot topic in literature. In [1], we studied the
energy harvesting point-to-point communication in cross-layer
view. The delay optimal data transmission was investigated
when the transmitter has hybrid energy.
Spectrum is another vital resource in wireless communica-
tions, besides energy. High spectrum efficiency is a permanent
aim in wireless system design. As a mature technique to
improve spectrum efficiency, cognitive radio (CR) remains in
center area of research. In [2], we studied the spectrum sharing
in OFDM-based cognitive radio networks (CRNs). Analytical
as well as iterative hierarchic power allocation algorithms were
designed for primary user (PU) and secondary user (SU).
As a natural idea of combing the virtue of energy harvesting
and CR, energy harvesting aided CR has been emerged with
the object of lifting the spectrum efficiency with green energy.
In [3], we discussed delay optimal data transmission in CR
with renewable energy. In [4], the probability of packet loss
was derived by proposing a Markovian battery model for
energy harvesting SUs. In [5], the achievable throughput of
energy harvesting SUs in overlay CRNs was analyzed. In [6],
the authors proposed a framework to depict the performance
of a solar energy harvesting cognitive metro-cellular network.
In [7], throughput maximization was studied and optimal
algorithm was proposed. In [8], the achievable throughput
maximization of SU under PU protection was considered,
and efficient algorithms were derived. In [9], robust power
control of energy harvesting SUs to maximize the throughput
performance was investigated.
In this paper, we focus on the cross-layer design of energy
harvesting CRNs. The physical layer power allocation is
optimized for network layer delay minimization. The main
contributions can be concisely stated as three-fold:
• A general and practical scenario is studied. The con-
sidered aspects include: The intermittence of harvested
energy, the randomness of data generation, and the fluc-
tuation of channel state, of each user; The hybrid energy
source of PU and the uncertainty of the grid price; The
interplay among users and the Signal-Interference-Ratio
(SIR) constraint at PU.
• A stochastic Stackelberg game is formulated in bi-level
form. As a basis, Nash equilibrium (NE) of the lower
level stochastic sub-game for SUs is computed. After-
wards, the whole stochastic Stackelberg game is investi-
gated under the scenario where no information exchange
is possible for PU and SUs.
• Based on the theoretical results, efficient distributive off-
line and on-line algorithms are designed.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System description
Consider a CR network, where a PU shares spectrum with
N SUs. Time is slotted with length τ each. The PU is denoted
as user 0, and SUs are user 1,· · · , user N . Formally, P = {0}
denotes the PU set, and S = {1, · · · , N} is the SU set.
Each user is composed of a Tx and a Rx. Each user Tx is
equipped with energy harvesting devices, e.g., solar panels.
The harvested energy is stored in a battery before usage at
each user Tx. In addition, the PU (user 0) can purchase the
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grid power under an average cost constraint. The grid power
with average constraint is applied to alleviate the lability of
harvested energy. Then a minimum quality of service (QoS)
of the PU can be guaranteed. The grid power price remains
static in a slot and fluctuates among slots. Data are generated
from the upper layer of each user and buffered in a first-in-
first-out (FIFO) queue. At the beginning of each slot, the user
Tx chooses some data from the buffer for delivering to the
corresponding Rx. We consider block fading model of the
wireless channels, i.e., the channel state remains static during
a slot and varies among different slots. The power gain of the
wireless channel between user i’ Tx and user j’s Rx during
the l-th slot is conveyed as gi,j [l].
Denote the transmitting power of user i ∈ P ∪ S at the l-th
slot as Pi[l], then its error-free instant data rate Ri[l] can be
expressed as
Ri[l] = log
(
1 +
Pi[l]gi,i[l]
σ2 + Ii[l]
)
(1)
where σ2 is the noise power spectral density at the Rx,
Ii[l] =
∑
j∈P∪S,j 6=i Pj [l]gj,i[l] is the received interference at
user i in the l-th slot. We assume unit bandwidth. Generally,
the power-rate function can be in other strictly concave and
monotonically increasing forms. We utilize (1) as a typical
example for better illustration. Let the stored energy in the
battery of user i at the beginning of the l-th slot be Ei[l], the
harvested energy during the l-th slot for user i be Ei[l]. With
respect to user i ∈ S, transmission energy is only allocated
from the battery, and then the evolution of the battery energy
can be given by
Ei[l + 1] = Ei[l]− Pi[l]τ + Ei[l] (2)
with Ei[0] being the initial battery energy. Signify the data
queue length of user i at the beginning of the l-th slot as
Qi[l], the generated data from upper layer during the l-th slot
for user i as Ai[l]. The data queue length of user i ∈ P ∪ S
evolves according to
Qi[l + 1] = Qi[l]−Ri[l]τ +Ai[l] (3)
with Ai[0] denoting the initial buffer data.
For conciseness, we define the following notations. 0 de-
notes the vector of “all zeros”, Ei =
(
Ei[1], · · · , Ei[L]
)T
,
Ri =
(
Ri[1], · · · , Ri[L]
)T
, Qi =
(
Qi[1], · · · , Qi[L]
)T
,
Pi =
(
Pi[1], · · · , Pi[L]
)T
, and Ii =
(Ii[1], · · · , Ii[L])T . T is
the matrix transpose,  () means element-wise less (more)
than or equal to.
B. Stochastic Stackelberg game formulation
Each user (including the PU and SUs) is rational, selfish,
and aims to minimize its own average buffer delay,
Di =
1
L+ 1
L+1∑
l=1
Qi[l], (4)
over the considered L slots. Meanwhile, to guarantee the PU’s
transmission, the SIR at the PU should not be less than a
constant ρ > 0.
To characterize the priority of the PU and competition
among users, a Stackelberg game is formulated in bi-level
form. The PU is viewed as the leader, and the SUs are as
followers.
1) Lower level - Noncooperative stochastic game for the
SUs: Define the state of user i ∈ S in the l-th slot as
Xi[l] =
(
Qi[l], Ei[l], {gj,i[l]}j∈P∪S,Ai[l], Ei[l]
)
with space Xi. The action of user i, Si[l], is its transmission
power, i. e., Si[l] = Pi[l] with space Si. Since the SUs
should comply with the harvested energy causality and the
data causality (i.e., the harvested energy and data can not be
utilized or sent before the transmitter receives them, respec-
tively). For state Xi[l], the action Si[l] = Pi[l] should satisfy
0 ≤ Pi[l] ≤ Ei[l] and 0 ≤ Ri[l] ≤ Qi[l]. Let Si(x) signify the
set of all possible actions of user i when the state is x ∈ Xi.
Γixsy means the state transition probability of user i. That is
to say, if the state of user i is x ∈ Xi at a slot and action
s ∈ Si(x) is adopted, the next state (state in next slot) of
user i is y ∈ Xi with probability Γixsy . Given the PU’s power
allocation P0, the SUs’ data transmission can be formulated as
a game G =
{
Ω,X,
{Si}i∈Ω,{Γixsy}i∈Ω,{ui}i∈Ω}. Ω = S
is the player set. X =
∏
i∈Ω
Xi is the state set. The strategy
set of user i (SU i) Si =
{
Pi : 0  Pi  Eiτ ,Ri  Qiτ
}
.
The objective is to minimize the buffer delay, then the utility
ui = Di.
2) Upper level - Stochastic optimization of the PU: The PU
has hybrid energy sources, i.e., the harvested energy together
with the grid power. Let V =
(
V [1], · · · , V [L])T and W =(
W [1], · · · ,W [L])T with V [l] and W [l] being the allocated
grid power and battery power, respectively, in the l-th slot.
The PU battery energy evolves according to
E0[l + 1] = E0[l]−W [l]τ + E0[l]. (5)
In addition to the harvested energy causality and buffer data
constraints, there are average cost and SIR constraints at the
PU. Formally, when the PU can anticipate the SUs reactions
to its action, the stochastic optimization problem can be given
by
min
P0=V+W
u0 = D0 (6)
s.t.

0 W  E0
τ
, (7a)
R0
({
P∗i
}
i∈Ω
)  Q0, (7b)
1
L
cTV ≤ C, (7c)
0  V, (7d)
ρI0
({
P∗i
}
i∈Ω
)  P0, (7e)
where c = (c[1], · · · , c[L]) with c[l] ≥ 0 being the price of the
grid power in the l-th slot,
{
P∗i
}
i∈Ω is the NE of the lower
stochastic game given P0.1 R0
({
P∗i
}
i∈Ω
)
and I0
({
P∗i
}
i∈Ω
)
1
{
P∗i
}
i∈Ω is the function of P0.
are the rate and received interference for PU, respectively,
when PU utilizes P0 and user (SU) i applies P∗i , i ∈ Ω. (7a)
states the causality constraint of the harvested power (energy),
(7b) is the instant rate constraint due to data causality, (7c)
means the average cost constraint of the PU, and (7e) denotes
the SIR constraint.
The lower stochastic game together with the upper stochas-
tic optimization constitute the stochastic Stackelberg game.
First, the PU chooses a power allocation P0 = V+W. Then
the SUs run the lower level noncooperative game to attain the
NE power allocations given the PU’s power accordingly. The
PU could anticipate the SUs reactions (i.e., power allocations)
to its power allocation. That is to say, the PU knows the SUs’
NE power corresponding to each of its transmission power.
Then (6) can be performed at the PU to derive the optimal
power P∗0. Once the PU achieves and carries out P
∗
0, the SUs
get the NE power through the lower game given P∗0. The
whole play ends thereby.
Remark: SUs are powered by the rechargeable battery (i.e.,
the harvested energy) ONLY. In contrast, the PU has hybrid
energy supply, i.e., the grid and the rechargeable battery.
Corresponding to the stochastic Stackelberg game, the action
of an SU is harvested allocation in each slot. And the action
of the PU is grid power together with battery allocation.
III. PROBLEM REEXPRESSION
For analysis convenience, we reconstruct the objective and
constraints.
A. Objective
According to (3), Qi[l] = Qi[0]+
∑l−1
k=1
(−Ri[k]τ+Ai[k]).
Combining with (4), we have
Di = Qi[0] +
1
L+ 1
L+1∑
l=1
l−1∑
k=1
Ai[k]− 1
L+ 1
L+1∑
l=1
l−1∑
k=1
Ri[k]τ
= Qi[0] +
1
L+ 1
L+1∑
l=1
l−1∑
k=1
Ai[k]−
L+1∑
l=1
L+ 1− l
L+ 1
Ri[l]τ
(8)
Define Ti =
L∑
l=1
αlRi[l]τ with αl = L+1−lL+1 . Then Di =
Qi[0] +
1
L
L∑
l=1
∑l−1
k=1Ai[k]−Ti. As Qi[0] and Ai[k] are phys-
ical conditions in the problem, minimizing Di is equivalent
to maximizing Ti. Thereby, the utility can be rewritten as
ui = Ti.
Remark: Ti is the discounted average throughput of user i.
B. Constraints
For user i ∈ S, i.e., the SU i, Pi and Ri are re-
lated to Ei and Qi according to (2) and (3), respectively.
The coupling incurs difficulties in problem analysis. De-
note Eai =
(Eai [1], · · · , Eai [k], · · · , Eai [L])T with Eai [k] =
∑k−1
l=0 Ei[l], Aai =
(Aai [1], · · · ,Aai [k], · · · ,Aai [L])T with
Aai [k] =
∑k−1
l=0 Ai[l], and A =

1
1 1
...
. . . . . .
1 1 · · · 1
.
The strategy set of SU i can be equivalently expressed as
Si =
{
Pi : APi  E
a
i
τ
,ARi  A
a
i
τ
,0  Pi
}
. (9)
Similarly, for the PU, the constraint can be equivalently
rewritten as 
AW  E
a
0
τ
, (10a)
0 W, (10b)
AR0
({
P∗i
}
i∈Ω
)  Aa0
τ
, (10c)
1
L
cTV ≤ C, (10d)
0  V, (10e)
ρI0
({
P∗i
}
i∈Ω
)  P0, (10f)
Remark: In the equivalently reconstructed constraints (9)
and (10), Eai and Aai are accumulated harvested energy and
data arrivals. Then there are only the physical conditions.
Consequently, the decoupling completes.
IV. GAME ANALYSIS AND ALGORITHM PROPOSAL
The stochastic Stackelberg game is formulated in bilevel
manner. Accordingly, the algorithm to get the NE of the lower
level problem is proposed first, and then distributed iterative
algorithms are proposed for the upper level (whole game),
Specially, an online scheme is given.
A. On lower level SUs’ stochastic game
We focus on “How to compute the NE of lower game?”
The optimization problem of user i (given PU and other SUs’
transmissions) can be expressed as
max
Pi
ui = Ti (11)
s.t.

APi  E
a
i
τ
, (12a)
0  Pi, (12b)
ARi  A
a
i
τ
(12c)
Through solving (11), we derive the best response of SU i
given the PU and other SUs’ actions. Thereafter, we have the
following off-line distributive iterated algorithm (Algorithm 1)
for obtaining the NE of the lower game.
Remark: In Algorithm 1, user i requires its own chan-
nel state sequence {gii[l]}l=1,··· ,L, data arrival sequence
{Ai[l]}l=1,··· ,L, harvested energy sequence {Ei[l]}l=1,··· ,L,
and measures the sequence of aggregated interference from
other users Ii. Hence, Algorithm 1 can be distributively
applied. In addition, Algorithm 1 requires all-slot (past,
current and future) system information (e.g., {gii[l]}l=1,··· ,L,
Algorithm 1: Iterated distributive off-line Algorithm
for deriving NE solution of lower-level game
Step 1: k = 0, initialize feasible policy for N SUs, P0i .
Step 2: For every i ∈ Ω, Update Pk+1i as the optimal policy (best
response) of user i by solving (11), given Pk−i :=
{
Pkj
}
j∈Ω,j 6=i.
Step 3: k = k + 1, go to Step 2 until convergence.
{Ai[l]}l=1,··· ,L, {Ei[l]}l=1,··· ,L, and Ii) as a priori, it is an
off-line algorithm
B. On upper level & the whole stochastic Stackelberg game
When information exchange is possible and the PU is
assumed to have accessibility of the private information of
SUs (each SU’s system state, e.g., data arrival, energy arrival,
etc.), it could anticipate the reactions of the SUs (follow-
ers). (6) can be mathematically carried out at the PU. The
stochastic Stackelberg game is generally a bilevel program-
ming problem[10], and specifically belongs to mathematical
programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC)[11]. However,
in the scenario that no information exchange exists among
PU and SUs, the PU could not obtain the SUs’ information,
and it can not anticipate SUs’ precise reactions to its action
thereby. Accordingly, the PU’s upper level problem (6) can not
exactly execute. Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) is unavailable.
How to investigate the problem in this scenario becomes a
natural topic. We propose an iterative algorithm referred to as
the NE based re-Optimization (NEO) algorithm (in Table I)
to give a solution under this situation. The NEO algorithm is
suboptimal to SE.
In Step 1, an initial PU’s power allocation is set. Next, in
Step 2, given the PU’s power, SUs run the lower level game
to arrive at the NE state. In Step 3, for fixed SUs’ power
allocations, the PU’s optimization problem (6) becomes
max
P0=V+W
T0 (13)
s.t.

AW  E
a
0
τ
, (14a)
0 W, (14b)
1
L
cTV ≤ C, (14c)
0  V, (14d)
AR0  A
a
0
τ
, (14e)
ρI0  P0, (14f)
By deriving the optimal solution of (13), we get a renewed
PU power. Given the updated PU power, we get a renewed
SUs’ NE... By repeating the process, a steady state, which is
the algorithm output, can be arrived in the end.
Remark: On one hand, the PU needs its own information
(e.g., E0, A0, etc.) and measures the received aggregated
interference I0 in solving (13). On the other hand, Algorithm 1
is a distributive scheme. Hence NEO algorithm is a distributive
approach.
TABLE I
NEO Algorithm
Step 1: k = 0, initialize a power allocation for the PU, P00.
Step 2: Given Pk0 , deriving the NE of the SUs’ game as
{
Pki
}
i∈Ω
through Algorithm 1.
Step 3: Given
{
Pki
}
i∈Ω, obtain P
∗
0 as the optimal solution of (13).
Update Pk+10 = ηP
∗
0 + (1− η)Pk0 , 0 < η ≤ 1 is a step size.
Step 4: k = k + 1, go to Step 2 until convergence.
C. An on-line algorithm
In above analysis and algorithm design, we assume the
information over all considered L slots as a prior (i.e., off-
line case). In practical applications, off-line condition is hard
to satisfy if not impossible (or the accomplishment cost is too
high). Then, online scheme, which requires only current slot
information by contrast, is important and necessary.
In each slot, the PU and SUs play a Stackelberg game,
where the strategy is power allocation in current slot and the
utility is the instant rate with a coefficient.
The SUs form a noncooperative game in each slot. Formally,
in the l-th slot, for user i ∈ S
max
Pi[l]
αlRi[l]τ (15)
s.t.

0 ≤ Pi[l] ≤ Ei[l]
τ
, (16a)
0 ≤ Ri[l] ≤ Qi[l]
τ
. (16b)
The solution (i.e., best response of SU i) is
P ∗i [l] = min
{
Ei[l]
τ
,
(
eQi[l]/τ − 1)σ2 + Ii[l]
gi,i[l]
}
. (17)
Remark: (17) means transmitting as many data as possible
in each slot, i.e., greedy policy.
Denote the available grid power budget at the beginning of
the l-th slot as B[l] with B[1] = LC. The budget evolution is
B[l + 1] = B[l]− c[l]V [l]. (18)
For the PU, as the grid power cost constraint is in average
sense. In the online design, we uniformly allocate the budget
constraint (formally, (20b)). In the l-th slot, the PU’s problem
becomes
max
P0[l]=V [l]+W [l]
αlR0[l]τ (19)
s.t.

0 ≤W [l] ≤ E0[l]
τ
, (20a)
0 ≤ c[l]V [l] ≤ B[l]
L− l + 1 , (20b)
0 ≤ R0[l] ≤ Q0[l]
τ
, (20c)
ρI0[l] ≤ P0[l]. (20d)
TABLE II
GoG Algorithm
Step 1: k = 0, initialize a power allocation for the PU, P 00 .
Step 2: (Obtaining the NE of SUs given Pk0 )
Step 2-1: m = 0, set initial power allocations of N SUs {P 0i }i∈S.
Step 2-2: Renew Pm+1i utilizing (17) given P
m
−i := {Pmj }j∈S,j 6=i
and Pk0 for i ∈ S
Step 2-3: m = m+ 1, go to Step 2-2 until convergence (or stopping
condition holds). The final output is
{
Pki
}
i∈S.
Step 3: Given
{
Pki
}
i∈S, update P
k+1
0 applying (21).
Step 4: k = k + 1, go to Step 2 until convergence.
The solution is
P ∗0 [l] = min
{
E0[l]
τ
+
B[l]
(L− l + 1)c[l] ,(
eQ0[l]/τ − 1)σ2 + I0[l]
g0,0[l]
}
. (21)
Remark: (21) demonstrates that the best response of the PU
is utilizing the greedy policy in each slot.
When obtaining P ∗0 [l], the grid power and harvested energy
allocations are given as follows: If P ∗0 [l] ≤ B[l](L−l+1)c[l] ,
V [l] = P ∗0 [l] and W [l] = 0; Otherwise, V [l] =
B[l]
(L−l+1)c[l]
and W [l] = P ∗0 [l]− B[l](L−l+1)c[l] .
The iterative online algorithm, Greedy one-slot Game
(GoG) algorithm, is outlined in Table II. In a slot, we apply
GoG algorithm to get the SUs’ power and PU’s power (includ-
ing the grid and harvested). Update related system information
(e.g., the system state, the grid power budget), and move to
next slot until completing all slots.
Remark: In GoG algorithm, each user requires its own
information and gauges the received aggregated inference.
Then GoG can be utilized distributively.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In the section, simulations are performed to demonstrate
the correctness and effectiveness of proposed algorithms. The
noise power spectral density σ2 = 0.1. The time slot length
τ = 1. In the settings, 1 PU, 2 SUs and 3 slots are considered,
i.e., N = 2 and L = 3.
Fig.1 draws the SUs’ NE power given the PU’s power
(100, 100, 100)T . In the simulations, Algorithm 1 is ap-
plied. The initial power are P01 = (360, 350, 340)
T and
P02 = (350, 350, 350)
T . The channel states are set as
g0,1 = (0.09, 0.07, 0.06)
T , g0,2 = (0.05, 0.1, 0.08)T , g1,1 =
(0.1, 0.15, 0.13)T , g1,2 = (0.07, 0.11, 0.085)T , g2,2 =
(0.12, 0.14, 0.16)T , and g2,1 = (0.07, 0.07, 0.08)T . The
data arrival A1 = (1, 2, 1) and A2 = (1, 0, 1). The re-
newable energy arrival E1 = (360, 350, 340) and E2 =
(345, 380, 370). Ai := (Ai[0],Ai[1],Ai[2]) (i = 1, 2, 3).
Ei := (Ei[0], Ei[1], Ei[2]) (i = 1, 2, 3). From the figures, we
can see that Algorithm 1 reaches the convergent points (i.e.,
NE) after not many iterations.
Fig. 2 illustrates the utility performance of NEO algorithm.
Different values of stepsize, η = 0.9 and η = 0.3, are set
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Fig. 1. NE power of SUs given P0 = (20, 20, 20)T when Algorithm 1 is
applied
for comparisons. The initial PU power is (300, 200, 200)T .
The channel states are set as g0,0 = (0.2, 0.3, 0.12)T
g0,1 = (0.09, 0.07, 0.06)
T , g0,2 = (0.05, 0.1, 0.08)T ,
g1,1 = (0.1, 0.15, 0.13)
T , g1,0 = (0.1, 0.06, 0.06)T , g1,2 =
(0.07, 0.11, 0.085)T , g2,2 = (0.12, 0.14, 0.16)T , g2,1 =
(0.07, 0.07, 0.08)T and g2,0 = (0.09, 0.065, 0.08)T . ρ = 0.01.
The data arrival A0 = (3, 5, 8), A1 = (1, 2, 1) and A2 =
(1, 0, 1). The harvested energy arrival E0 = (600, 500, 450),
E1 = (360, 350, 340) and E2 = (345, 380, 370). c =
(1, 1.2, 0.9)T and C = 100. We can observe that when η
decreases, the convergence speed becomes slow. This can be
explained as follows: In the update of PU power (Step 3),the
larger η is , the nearer the renewed power approaches the best
response. Generally, best response is the shortest path to the
final points. Hence larger η leads to higher speed. The NEO
algorithm finally converges to T0 = 1.7620, T1 = 0.7111 and
T2 = 0.7938.
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Fig. 2. NEO algorithm with different stepsize η
Fig. 3 plots the utility performance of NEO and GoG
with respect to the grid power budget C. The channel gains
are g0,0 = (0.2, 0.3, 0.12)T g0,1 = (0.09, 0.07, 0.06)T ,
g0,2 = (0.05, 0.1, 0.08)
T , g1,1 = (0.2, 0.15, 0.23)T , g1,0 =
(0.1, 0.06, 0.04)T , g1,2 = (0.06, 0.10, 0.08)T , g2,2 =
(0.12, 0.2, 0.18)T , g2,1 = (0.07, 0.09, 0.06)T and g2,0 =
(0.07, 0.06, 0.08)T . ρ = 0.01. The step size of NEO is
η = 0.8. The energy arrival E0 = (600, 500, 450), E1 =
(350, 400, 340) and E2 = (345, 380, 350) The data arrival
A1 = (2, 2, 1) and A2 = (1, 3, 2). The grid power price
c = (1.5, 2.0, 0.9)T . A0 = (3, 4, 3). By comparing the NEO
and GoG, we can see that the NEO has better SU performance
and the GoG has better PU performance. From the figure, it
can be observed that the PU’s utility increases and the SUs’
utilities decrease at first, and all remain constant then when
we increase the grid power budget C. The explanations are as
follows: When C is mild, the increase will give more power for
PU transmission, then the utility performance of PU improves.
More PU transmission produces more interference to SUs, and
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Fig. 3. Utility performance of NEO and GoG regarding C
the SUs’ utility performance degrades accordingly. Once C is
larger than some value (e.g., 30000 in the figure), the PU utility
reaches as the upper bound 3 ∗ 34 + 4 ∗ 24 + 3 ∗ 14 = 5. After
that, the instant rate constraint becomes active and the utility
remains static. Meanwhile, the interference from PU becomes
static at SUs and utility becomes some constant.
VI. CONCLUSION
Energy harvesting aided CRN is investigated in cross-layer
view. We study the physical layer power control for the sake
of minimizing the network delay. A stochastic Stackelberg
game is constructed in bilevel format. Distributive off-line al-
gorithms, NEO algorithms, and distributive on-line algorithm,
GoG algorithm, are proposed based on theoretical analyses.
Numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of proposed
algorithms.
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